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ATTITUDES OF KEY WORLD POWERS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

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ATTITUDES OF KEY WORLD POWERS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES

THE PROBLEM

To assess the underlying motivations and objectives of key world powers—the USSR, Communist China, France, the UK, West Germany, and Canada—in the field of disarmament and arms control.

SCOPE

Disarmament, as used in this estimate, refers generally to all forms and degrees of arms limitation, controls, regulation or reduction, and is not restricted to the idea of abolition of armaments. Where useful or necessary, the terms “general and complete disarmament” or “arms control” will be specified in the discussion according to the context.

This estimate does not aim to present the detailed negotiating positions of the various powers on all disarmament issues, or to examine the merits of different technical proposals, but rather to inquire into the underlying motivations and factors affecting the general attitudes of these states.

CONCLUSIONS

1. It is clear that the Soviet leaders see, in agitation of the disarmament issue, a prime opportunity to further their political purposes in the non-Communist world. What is not so clear is the extent to which they may actually desire to conclude agreements on disarmament. In approaching this latter question, they are influenced in contrary directions by a variety of considerations.
2. Communist ideology sanctions the use of any means which is deemed expedient to advance its cause. Military power in various forms, including the delivery of arms, is one of these means, and the Communist leaders are using it to extend their control and influence. At the same time, Marxism-Leninism, while favoring and supporting “wars of liberation,” teaches that the fundamental political,

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economic, and social forces at work in the world can bring about the eventual worldwide triumph of communism. And Communist doctrine enjoins the USSR to instigate and support subversive and revolutionary activities to accelerate final victory. One theoretically possible way to give revolutionary forces freer play would be by reducing or eliminating Western military force through agreements on disarmament. Marxism-Leninism therefore permits the Soviet leaders to consider that if the armed forces of their opponents were reduced or eliminated, the results might be worth limitations of their own military power, always provided the military power balance was not shifted to their disadvantage. (*Para. 14*)

3. The Soviets are also concerned by the consequences to them of general nuclear war. We believe that they continue to think that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be to their advantage. They also see advantages in some kinds of disarmament measures directed against the various ways in which nuclear war might break out. They are probably also attracted to disarmament measures as a possible means of achieving a military advantage by encouraging the West to cut its defense efforts even further than the terms of agreement, and of promoting a climate of relaxation favorable to Communist exploitation. (*Paras. 16-19*)

4. On the other hand, the Soviets perceive dangers and disadvantages in the prospect of substantial disarmament. They are deeply conscious of the impact which the image and the substance of their military strength have made upon the world, of the security which that strength has given them as compared with

their exposed position in the past, and of the respect which it has compelled from other nations. Furthermore, the USSR would be reluctant to undertake measures which might endanger its control over Eastern Europe or alter the relationship of power, and hence of political weight, between itself and Communist China. (*Paras. 21, 25*)

5. From the Soviet point of view, the greatest difficulty in reaching disarmament agreements favorable to their ultimate world objectives is presented by Western requirements for inspection. A primary reason for the strong Soviet aversion to inspection is military: having developed secrecy into a major military asset, the Soviets are reluctant to impair and unwilling to relinquish secrecy until assured that the enemy has given up the forces which might use in an attack the knowledge acquired through inspection. Another is political: while the regime's anxieties concerning contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners are diminishing, the implications of an international inspectorate—cooperation with the enemy and recognition of a higher sovereignty in the control organization—remain inimical to the political outlook fostered by the Communist Party. Finally, the Soviets obviously oppose effective inspection because it would foreclose the option of evading the agreement. (*Paras. 22-24*)

6. Apart from these considerations, the Soviets have a most lively sense of the political uses of talking about disarmament. Realizing that the intricacies of the subject are little understood, they have hit upon their proposal for general and complete disarmament as a way to capture the universal yearning for peace

and, at the same time, to label the West as "against" disarmament. It is not a proposal which they expect to have to make good on, but it is a highly potent instrument of political warfare. (*Para. 31*)

7. The Soviet leaders may conclude, however, that some more modest proposals offer sufficient advantages, in terms both of their particular effects and the impetus they would provide to general agitation of the disarmament theme, to justify entering upon serious discussions of limited measures. They expect their advocacy of general and complete disarmament to create a strong position for them in any such negotiations. To date, however, the disadvantages of limited measures, including the inspection they would entail, appear to have predominated in Soviet thinking. (*Paras. 32-44*)

8. The Chinese Communists approach the disarmament question in a different spirit. They are less concerned than the USSR with the dangers of war, and they regard the tactic of negotiation with the enemy as offering dubious prospects and tending to sap revolutionary fervor. Peiping's primary interest in disarmament, therefore, lies in the political gains—diplomatic recognition, the return of Taiwan, admission to the UN—which it hopes to extract when its participation in disarmament negotiations is sought. (*Paras. 45-46, 48*)

9. The Chinese leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear capability and appear to suspect (probably rightly) that Soviet disarmament policy is designed in part to delay or prevent this. They are anxious to forestall any agreements which might have this effect, such as the com-

bination of a nuclear test ban and an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons and technology to other countries. We believe that, as China's weight within the Bloc grows, certain arms control measures are becoming more attractive to the USSR, while at the same time Chinese pressures are impinging upon Soviet freedom of action. (*Paras. 26, 47, 49*)

10. The strongest support for disarmament comes from Canada, which is especially concerned with being caught up in a nuclear war and has attempted to create a role for itself as a leader of the "middle powers," urging the major contestants into serious negotiations. Another strong supporter of disarmament is the UK, which sees in arms control measures a chance to close the nuclear club and to initiate movement toward an East-West detente. In spite of a strong and genuine interest in disarmament both at the official and popular level, the government does not wish to jeopardize its relationship with the US by separating itself too far from US policies on disarmament. France, on the other hand, is determined not to be prevented from acquiring a national nuclear capability. French attitudes on disarmament will continue to be based on considerations of national prestige and the satisfaction of de Gaulle's desire for international status, even though his determination to acquire nuclear forces is not widely shared by other French political leaders or even by many military leaders. The West German attitude toward disarmament is marked by an intense preoccupation with the implications of any general disarmament agreement for the special security problems of the Federal Republic. As West

Germany's national power increases, we believe that it will seek a more direct voice in disarmament matters. Both France and West Germany oppose region-

al schemes confined to Central Europe, fearing that these would discriminate against them and jeopardize collective security with the West. (*Paras. 50-63*)

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD DISARMAMENT

A. General Considerations

11. It may be worth recalling that as early as 1927 the Soviet Union appeared on the international scene with a spectacular plea for disarmament. Maxim Litvinov urged that the world adopt not merely the partial and carefully hedged proposals for reductions which had long been discussed among the nations, but general and complete disarmament. Litvinov's effort gained immense publicity, and won considerable acclaim for the USSR, but came to nothing.

12. Even though the world situation has profoundly altered, the Soviets recognize now, as they did then, that disarmament is unsurpassed as a theme for propaganda. They see the opportunity to identify themselves with popular yearnings for peace, and with the promise of transferring resources expended on armaments to the furtherance of social and economic development throughout the world. Since the intricacies of negotiated disarmament are little understood by the general public, the Soviets hope to be able to discredit the West by labeling it as "against" disarmament, and therefore against the good ends associated with disarmament. They have given increased emphasis to disarmament as one of the central themes of their worldwide propaganda assault on the US and other Western powers, on a par for example with the theme of anticolonialism. Their claim to repeated initiatives for disarmament, as against the alleged Western opposition or foot-dragging on it, is intended to mobilize world opinion in general support of Soviet conduct and purposes on the international scene.

13. This propaganda effort obscures Communist revolutionary aims, and disposes significant sectors of opinion in many countries to accept platforms of joint political action with the Communists. It thus operates in support of current Communist "peaceful coexistence" tactics. The "struggle" for disarmament is used as a unifying slogan to draw Socialist, pacifist, and left-oriented groups into working cooperation with the Communists, thus setting a pattern of joint action which enables the Communists to command a larger popular following than their revolutionary doctrines alone can gain for them. These "united fronts," the Communists hope, can then be manipulated in support of whatever other tactical objectives they may be pursuing in a particular country. At a minimum, however, such political agitation fronts help to promote dissension within and among the Western nations. At the same time, on a more general plane, disarmament appeals are directed to uncommitted governments with a view to seeking their diplomatic alignment with the Bloc. The issue of disarmament as the Soviets see it, therefore, merges into the general struggle between the two world systems.

14. Communist ideology sanctions the use of any means which is deemed expedient to advance its cause. Military power in various forms, including the delivery of arms, is one of these means, and the Communist leaders are using it to extend their control and influence. At the same time, Marxism-Leninism, while favoring and supporting "wars of liberation," teaches that the fundamental political, economic, and social forces at work in the world can bring about the eventual worldwide triumph of communism. And Communist doctrine enjoins the USSR

to instigate and support subversive and revolutionary activities to accelerate final victory. One theoretically possible way to give revolutionary forces freer play would be by reducing or eliminating Western military forces through agreements on disarmament. Marxism-Leninism therefore permits the Soviet leaders to consider that if the armed forces of their opponents were reduced or eliminated, the results might be worth limitations of their own military power, always provided the military power balance was not shifted to their disadvantage.

15. Such broad political and ideological considerations, however, are not all that form the Soviet attitude toward disarmament. The leaders of the Soviet state must also give attention to the practicalities of disarmament, the virtues and defects of various projects for arms control, and the tactics of negotiation. The Soviet approach to disarmament on this level is influenced by a number of contradictory considerations, which may affect different members of the Soviet leadership in varying degree. The "real" Soviet position can only be ascertained in actual negotiations.

16. Among the practical and immediate considerations which have influenced Soviet views on disarmament in recent years, the most compelling has almost certainly been an acute realization of the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The Soviet leaders probably regard general nuclear war as the one contingency which would gravely threaten their nation and the cause of communism. While they consider their own growing intercontinental nuclear power as a strong deterrent to such a war, they remain concerned that it might occur, and are anxious to reduce and if feasible to eliminate this possibility.

17. Short of the virtual elimination of the possibility of nuclear war by disarmament measures, the Soviets are probably interested in arms control agreements to reduce the chances of unintended or accidental nuclear war. In this connection, they show considerable concern over the "Nth country problem," or acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries, and prefer that the op-

portunity for touching off nuclear war not be permitted to spread to US allies and neutrals, or indeed to their own allies.

18. The Soviet leaders probably also see some chance of obtaining, through arms control measures, political and military advantages in the retraction of Western military power. To diminish Western military means of opposing subversive, revolutionary or other activities in non-Communist countries—as in Algeria and Laos—would in their view constitute an important gain. Thus the Soviets probably believe that some disarmament agreements, while putting equal military restrictions on both sides, could be to their net advantage. They may also think that limited arms control measures would engender further unilateral Western military retrenchment. They may even think it possible to get some agreements with control provisions of a character which would permit evasion with little risk of detection. While the Soviets probably do not expect Western acceptance of measures which give them a clearly one-sided advantage, they do seek to stir up public pressure and to divide the Western allies in efforts to maximize the advantages they might obtain.

19. Disarmament measures would also contribute to a general climate of political relaxation in the non-Communist world. Even a very limited agreement on arms limitation or reduction would arouse widespread expectations of improved relations and further disarmament. As the Communist military threat seemed to recede still further in the new climate, the Soviet leaders would expect that differences among the Western Powers would become sharper, and that their alliances would tend to be undermined.

20. A possible Soviet incentive for disarmament is the economic burden of the arms race. The Soviet leaders are bound to be concerned by the growing cost of complex modern weapons systems. However, they have eased their present economic burden, following the Western example, by unilateral reductions in manpower and in marginally useful older weapons systems. We do not believe that the economic burden of the Soviet

military establishment is so great as to exert compelling pressure for arms reductions. There might be economic benefits in limited disarmament arrangements (offset in some cases by the costs of inspection), and agreements might reduce pressures for higher arms outlays. By and large, however, the economic factor would probably be of minor importance in any agreements short of comprehensive disarmament.

21. Along with the advantages of disarmament, the Soviets see substantial dangers and difficulties. As good Communists, the Soviet leaders envisage in some far future a Communist world without arms and without war. For the present, however, they are deeply conscious of the impact which the image and the substance of their military strength has made upon the world, of the security which it has given them as compared with their exposed position in the past, and of the respect which it has compelled from other nations. They are aware of its usefulness as an instrument of politics, and of intimidation. They will not easily give up any appreciable portion of this element of national power.

22. Of all the practical difficulties standing in the way of various arms control agreements, from the Soviet point of view the greatest is probably that presented by Western requirements for inspection. Obviously, in negotiating any agreement the Soviets would hope to leave open for themselves the option of evading it, and would resist demands for inspection procedures which foreclosed this option. But their objections go much further. The USSR has traditionally given extraordinary emphasis to military secrecy. One of the USSR's major military assets is its ability to maintain a high degree of secrecy concerning weapons production, deployment, and performance. Thus, in the Soviet view, even a comparatively small amount of inspection would represent a major sacrifice of military assets by the USSR, and could not be justified unless a very substantial sacrifice of military assets by the US were assured. We believe, for example, that the Soviets are so averse to letting foreign inspectors locate their long-range missile sites that they would not

permit the West to obtain such information except as part of the mutual elimination of all long-range striking forces. Particularly if they were concealing considerable weakness in the offensive missile field there would be an additional incentive not to permit this to become known. The advent of effective US reconnaissance satellites might have a mitigating effect on Soviet aversion to foreign inspectors, especially if the Soviets were not able to counter them.

23. A second aspect of inspection which greatly concerns the Soviet leaders is the effect on Soviet society of the presence of large numbers of foreign inspectors having certain rights of movement and inquiry. The implicit recognition of a higher sovereignty in the international control organization does not fit the pattern of authority which has been created in the USSR. Cooperation on so extensive a scale with the "enemy" would also run counter to the idea of ideological conflict on which authority in Communist society greatly depends. The Soviet leaders are also concerned over possible subversive contacts, though such concern has declined in recent years as the regime has gained confidence in the loyalty of its people, as the discrepancy in standards of living has lessened, and as tourism and cultural and other contacts have expanded without serious consequences.

24. While their concern for secrecy remains high, the Soviets are apparently now at least willing to contemplate some limited inspection arrangements, as they have indicated, for example, in connection with negotiations on a nuclear test ban. The political causes of Soviet secretiveness have lessened in recent years and we believe that they will continue gradually to diminish. However, Moscow's desire to preserve its advantage of military secrecy is likely to remain a principal obstacle to disarmament agreements requiring comprehensive control arrangements.

25. Another significant factor in Soviet calculations on disarmament is the effect it might have on the USSR's position within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The Soviet leaders would be very apprehensive about the sta-

bility of the satellite regimes in Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany, if the shadow of the Soviet military power were substantially diminished. Furthermore, they would be very much concerned over measures which altered the relationship of power, and hence of political weight, between the USSR and China. For example, disarmament of Soviet nuclear-missile forces would at the least make China's vast population a more important counter in the scales of power, as well as removing one of the key indices of Soviet strength.

26. Chinese Communist attitudes are coming to have a weightier influence on Soviet disarmament policy. These Chinese attitudes are outlined later, but here we must note that the prospects for Chinese accession to disarmament measures are very poor, at least unless extreme political demands are met, and that Peiping cannot be compelled to join agreements simply at Moscow's behest. This presents the Soviet leaders with numerous complications. They are probably moved toward certain arms control agreements by the desire to restrain Chinese nuclear weapons development. On the other hand, they must calculate the degree of pressure they can exert upon their ally without imperiling the alliance. They must foresee the concessions which the Chinese may demand from the West and from the USSR itself. In general, we believe that China's weight within the Bloc will grow, and that the importance of such considerations for Soviet policy will increase.

27. A final restraining factor in the Soviet attitude toward disarmament is the general area of uncertainty, the "unknowns" that would be involved in embarking on such a crucially important new field marking unprecedented strategic decisions and not fully calculable consequences. These unknowns include the risk of oversight in devising disarmament measures and controls, and unforeseen political effects. These concerns are, of course, most prominent in considering drastic moves such as general and complete disarmament, and their weight probably varies in the thinking of different members of the Soviet leadership.

28. It is difficult to judge how the Soviets might balance all these incentives and disadvantages in making decisions on any disarmament or arms control measure. Since they use propaganda both to increase pressure on the West to accede to agreements which they desire, and also to mask or distort proposals which they do not, the real Soviet preference seldom is clear from the public propaganda face. In negotiation, Soviet techniques of pressure to extract maximum concessions before agreement generally make it difficult to divine the true Soviet attitude.

29. The Soviet leaders think it highly unlikely that the leaders of the "imperialist camp" would willingly give up principal elements of their power. Accordingly, they almost certainly do not believe that any substantial disarmament agreements are likely to be soon negotiated with the West. On the other hand, they do believe that pressures for disarmament can be placed upon the Western leaders by aroused public opinion and by divisions among the Western states. They expect that the West will seek to gain maximum advantage in any negotiations, but they may believe that in some cases the West would see sufficient benefit to itself or find itself under sufficient pressure to agree to some measures which the Soviets also desired.

B. General and Complete Disarmament

30. As we have noted, there is a sense in which Moscow would view general and complete disarmament as a revolutionary political development facilitating the victory of world communism through political, economic, and subversive means. Moreover, the danger of an accidental or desperate Western attack which could seriously arrest the course, if not the final outcome, of the historical movement of the world to communism, would be entirely averted. Further, it is the disarmament measure most likely to offer substantial gains for the more rapid achievement of economic goals of Communist society, and to cause Western societies to suffer economic dislocation and disorientation. At the same time, general and complete disarmament would involve

many of the disadvantages which we have previously discussed, such as the loss of military might, the political implications of inspection, the risks of evacuating Eastern Europe, and the reduction of the USSR's weight within the Bloc.

31. It is certain that the Soviets would sign a general agreement committing all parties to achieve general and complete disarmament. But it is almost as certain that, in the negotiations on practical details, particularly inspection, they would be unwilling to meet Western requirements or to carry out such disarmament. They probably do not expect to be confronted with this sort of problem, however. Their ideology leads them to see certain advantages for their cause in general and complete disarmament. It also makes them believe that the capitalists will recoil from the proposition, and that they will never have to make good on an agreement. Almost certainly, moreover, they recognize that the practical difficulties of enforcing general and complete disarmament, throughout the entire world, would be virtually insuperable. They are also aware that it has been arms or the threat of arms which has enabled the Communist bloc to expand, and in any final decision they would give great weight to this fact. Thus they probably have not felt it necessary to reach a final decision on whether a disarmed world would on balance be advantageous to them. But they do feel themselves free to advocate this measure in order to capture the "peace" theme in world opinion and to put the West on the defensive in disarmament negotiations. It is not a proposal which they expect to have to make good on, but it is a highly potent instrument of political warfare.

C. Comprehensive Partial Measures

32. For some time the Soviet leaders have insisted that they have no interest in measures of partial and comprehensive disarmament—that is, measures for across-the-board reduction of weapons and military establishments, but without their abolition. Probably the chief reason for this Soviet attitude is that any advantage they might achieve thereby

would not be sufficient to compensate for the amount of inspection and control which would be required. Moreover, the Soviets wish to stick to their propaganda for general and complete disarmament, and to denounce all half measures. They have proclaimed their willingness to discuss what are in effect comprehensive partial measures, with controls, if these were clearly stages on the way to a firmly assured general and complete disarmament. And it is possible that they might develop an interest in and propose comprehensive measures outside the context of general and complete disarmament, providing that the degree of disarmament was, in their minds, consonant with the degree of inspection. In this field the possible permutations and combinations are almost innumerable, and we cannot attempt to estimate how the Soviets might respond to various proposals.

D. Particular Arms Control Measures

33. The Soviets have taken the position that a commitment to general and complete disarmament as a final goal must precede discussions of particular arms control measures. They may, however, have an interest in limited agreements which would serve particular military or political purposes. If so they would probably agree to discuss such measures, singly or in combination, seeking to put these discussions within a framework of progress toward general and complete disarmament. It is possible that two or more measures in combination might in their total implications be either more or less acceptable to the Soviets than any one of them taken by itself. In the following paragraphs we examine separately the chief arms control measures now under active or prospective consideration.

34. *Nuclear Test Ban.* The Soviets have seen several advantages to themselves in an agreement banning all nuclear weapons tests. They hope that such an agreement would gain them credit for having initiated an important step toward peace, would raise obstacles to the spread of nuclear capabilities to additional countries—especially West Germany and Communist China—and would lend impetus to

the movement toward general disarmament. In recent months, however, there have been indications that Soviet interest in a test ban as an isolated measure may be declining. If this proves to be the case, it may be that the Soviet view has been modified because of pressure from their Chinese ally, because of recognition that a ban is not likely to be effective in closing the nuclear club, or because of a desire to free themselves from present constraints on testing and the hope that the US will take the onus of doing so first.^{1 2} It is an open question whether they now see enough advantage in concluding an agreement to move much closer to Western terms.

35. *Cutoff of Fissionable Materials Production and Reduction of Stockpiles.* We believe that the Soviets probably do not favor an agreement to cease production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes at this time, primarily because we do not believe that the Soviets have met their stockpile requirements. The Soviets might at some time agree to a cutoff, but only if they had met their minimum stockpile requirements, if the control and inspection system were not unacceptable in its scope, and if mutual reductions of existing stockpiles could be made in such a way that the relative power position of the USSR vis-a-vis the US was at no stage impaired.

36. *Nontransfer of Nuclear Weapons to Nth Countries.* The Soviets probably would like to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to any country not now possessing such weapons. They consider that the emergence of new nuclear powers would in no case be of advantage to them, and could be particularly dangerous in West Germany and Communist China. They are, however, subject to pressure from their Chinese ally, which is strongly opposed to any arrangement which would effectively and permanently bar it from attaining a nuclear capability. A prohibition on transfer of such weapons, if coupled with

¹ The question of whether or not the Soviets have conducted covert nuclear tests is not discussed in this paper.

² The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes there is evidence to indicate the Soviets have continued nuclear testing.

a universal nuclear test ban, would seriously impede acquisition of such a capability both by China and by Germany. It is likely, therefore, that the Chinese Communists would exert sufficient pressure on Moscow to block one or the other of these measures. The USSR would almost certainly insist that any agreement on nontransfer be applicable to alliances (e.g., NATO) as well as to individual countries, and they might also try to make it dependent upon US willingness to give up the stationing of nuclear weapons in other countries.

37. *Ban on Use of Nuclear Weapons.* We believe that the USSR continues to favor an agreement for a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and may press such a proposal, particularly if a test ban is achieved. They probably calculate that this would have the effect of weakening confidence in US alliance commitments.³ They also see in this measure an opportunity to reduce the nuclear threat to their national security and to maximize the conventional superiority which they can bring to bear in many areas. The Soviets would prefer an agreement never to use nuclear weapons, but would probably be satisfied with an agreement never to use them "first." Such an agreement would, in Soviet eyes, further constrain possible Western use of such weapons in limited war situations, and would involve no cost to the Soviets since they probably do not intend to use nuclear weapons in such situations anyway.⁴

38. *Control of Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.* The Soviets include weapons of biological, chemical, and radiological warfare

³ The Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff, would write the first two sentences as follows: We believe that the USSR continues to favor a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons, because they believe these weapons constitute the principal obstacle to their attainment of their objectives by the use or threat of force and because they believe themselves to enjoy a superiority in conventional forces.

⁴ The Director of the Atomic Energy Commission notes that further development in the nuclear weapons field could make the use of such weapons advantageous to the Soviets also and therefore Soviet intentions in this regard could change with time.

among "weapons of mass destruction" which should be banned. However, they evidently regard the problem as much less important than that of controlling nuclear weapons. If a ban on nuclear weapons were ever reached, the Soviets might press for banning BW-CW-RW weapons. They probably recognize that inspection requirements for BW and CW would be so extensive that effective control measures would probably be acceptable to them only under virtually complete disarmament.

39. *Measures to Avert Surprise Attack.* The Soviets have shown little interest in agreeing upon measures to prevent surprise attack, probably because they recognize that the degree of inspection required would be greater than they are prepared to accept, as well as denying them the option of surprise attack. They would of course like to reduce Western capabilities for surprise attack, for example, by certain regional disarmament arrangements, or by elimination of overseas bases, but they almost certainly do not expect to accomplish such reduction on any significant scale.

40. *Stabilized Deterrent Force Levels.* Westerners have unofficially discussed with Soviet scientists the idea of "stabilizing" mutual deterrence by fixing the size of long-range striking forces (with necessary inspection). Such ideas run contrary to the stated Soviet position on general and complete disarmament, and initial unofficial Soviet reactions to them have been negative. Thus far the Soviets have probably given no extended study to such an arrangement, and they continue to regard secrecy as an essential element in the strength of their deterrent forces. During the near future, they are almost certain not to entertain the concept of stabilized deterrents, except possibly in the context of a transitional stage in an agreement on general and complete disarmament. As time goes on, the dangers and costs of an unbridled arms race might come in time to weigh more heavily in their considerations, and we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets may eventually give serious attention to such proposals.

41. *Nonmilitarization of Outer Space.* The Soviets vigorously rejected earlier US proposals for nonmilitarization of outer space, because they concluded that these proposals were directed primarily against their long-range missile capability. Suspicion on this point has affected their attitude to more recent US proposals directed exclusively against space-launched or space-orbited weapons, but the Soviets may be willing to accept the idea of prohibiting the placing of weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies. They favor limiting outer space to "peaceful uses," which they define as prohibition not only of weapons but also of military reconnaissance activities.

42. *Regional Arms Controls.* The changing technology of war has altered the military considerations in regional limitations on deployment of nuclear weapons, and on zonal inspection as a means of reducing the risks of surprise attack. The Soviets continue to see considerable advantages in various regional arrangements which would inhibit Western military deployment, particularly in nuclear weapons. These schemes would be of special significance in the NATO area, where the Soviets would intend their effect to be the detachment of one or more countries in the zone from NATO. Arms control measures such as nuclear free zones or elimination of foreign bases in a given region therefore continue to play a role in Soviet political strategy. They are currently advocating such measures for Africa.

43. *Cessation of Arms Shipments.* Except for the special case of transfer of nuclear weapons, the Soviets probably do not believe agreements on cessation of arms shipments would be advantageous to them. They have acquired varying degrees of influence, and have succeeded in stimulating discord among countries in the non-Communist world, by supplying military equipment to a number of countries. There may be exceptions for some limited areas where the Soviets would consider it to their benefit to agree to ban arms shipments, but we do not believe that they would accept this as a general approach in the field of arms controls.

44. *Conventional Force Reductions.* The Soviets have, by unilateral reductions in manpower and in some conventional arms, placed themselves for the first time in a "competitive" position in the propaganda about disarmament. By the end of 1961 they will probably about equal the US military manpower level of a little under 2.5 million men. Since they are able to maintain a larger operational field force at a given manpower level, and have a large mobilization potential, this does not mean parity in capabilities on the periphery of the Communist bloc. Indeed, because the USSR can field a larger number of divisions from an equivalent number of men, and because US forces are widely dispersed, the Soviets probably calculate that any further agreed mutual reductions of conventional forces or military manpower would cause a greater reduction and retraction of US military power than it would of their own. However, the Soviets are not likely to agree to general reductions or limitations in manpower or conventional arms as an isolated measure.

II. CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDES TOWARD DISARMAMENT

45. Chinese Communist views on disarmament are part of a distinctive world outlook which derives in large part from China's internal and international position. The regime sees itself as destined to lead its country into the front rank of great powers. The Chinese leaders have reacted bitterly to what they regard as Western unwillingness to accord China the rights and status which it claims. Their strategy has been one of uncompromising struggle, expressed not only in demands for diplomatic recognition as the government of China and the restoration of Taiwan, but also in attempts to press a more militant anti-imperialist course upon the entire Sino-Soviet Bloc. This line of maximum enmity has also been useful in justifying the demands which the regime has placed upon the domestic population.

46. Thus the Chinese regard East-West negotiations only as a means of putting pressure on their antagonists, not as an occasion for seek-

ing even partial reconciliations of interests. With respect to negotiations on disarmament, their views are further affected by their apparent belief that China would survive nuclear war and perhaps even gain from it. When their commitment to the belief that the "imperialists" use negotiations only as a trick is taken into account, it becomes evident that the prospects for Chinese agreement in the disarmament field are poor indeed.

47. In particular, we believe that the Chinese Communists are determined to acquire a nuclear capability, with Soviet assistance if possible but by their own efforts if necessary. We doubt that they could be dissuaded from this intention, even by the USSR. Thus they would adhere to a test ban only if they were assured that it would not prevent them from acquiring a nuclear capability. The Chinese appear to suspect (probably rightly) that Soviet disarmament policy is designed in part to deny them nuclear status and to limit their ability to undertake independent ventures which might involve the USSR.

48. The Chinese leaders are aware that most major disarmament agreements could not be fully effective without China's adherence. Peiping has taken the position that it will not be bound by disarmament agreements reached without its participation, and further that it will not participate in disarmament negotiations with states which do not recognize it. If its participation is sought, therefore, China would almost certainly demand a political price by raising such issues as diplomatic recognition, the return of Taiwan, and admission to the UN.

49. It is not certain that the belligerence which has marked Peiping's world view since 1957 will necessarily continue unabated in the years ahead. Even if the Chinese posture became more moderate in the future however, China would still be in a position to exert considerable leverage on both the US and the USSR. Its price for adherence to disarmament agreements would continue high, although it might enter into negotiations if in the meantime it had gained admission to the UN or acquired nuclear weapons.

III. FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD DISARMAMENT

50. De Gaulle's strong nationalistic beliefs make the French approach to disarmament a special problem for the West. Although de Gaulle favors controlled disarmament in principle, he considers the question secondary to the objective of making France a full member of the nuclear club. Because the French nuclear arms program is still in an early test phase, de Gaulle will judge any partial steps in terms of how they affect the continuing development of his national weapons program, or in terms of how they affect the French bargaining position vis-a-vis the other nuclear powers and French leadership in Western Europe.

51. At the same time, the French recognize the political and propaganda value of disarmament and insist that France must play an important role in any discussions in this field with the Soviets. Their basic position has been, and will almost certainly continue to be, that controls cannot be applied to nuclear weapons (which they have) without also being applied to advanced delivery systems (which they do not yet have). They have in effect consistently opposed a universal ban on nuclear tests and will probably continue their opposition, at least until such time as they are capable of producing the nuclear warheads they want or are assured of receiving such a capability from their allies.

52. De Gaulle is opposed to European regional disengagement arrangements, fearful that almost any such plan would leave France dangerously exposed on the continent. Moreover, he would reject any such arrangement that appeared to discriminate against West Germany, not only out of concern for his close ties with Bonn, but also because of his apprehension that Germany might thereby be set adrift between East and West, and that the US in such circumstances might withdraw from the continent altogether.

53. Because of heavy requirements imposed on them by the Algerian war, the French have resisted inclusion of military manpower ceilings in Western proposals. They do not, how-

ever, oppose such ceilings in principle and probably would, if hostilities were ended, agree to reduction of force levels as long as they were not below those of the UK and West Germany.

54. In general, French attitudes on disarmament will continue to be based on considerations of national prestige and the satisfaction of de Gaulle's desire for international status. It is unlikely that he can be persuaded to adapt his own approach on disarmament to a joint US-UK position merely for the sake of obtaining a unified Western policy. Instead, he will probably continue to emphasize the interrelationship of various aspects of disarmament and the necessity for reaching general, overall agreement, in the hope of gaining time for the completion of the French nuclear weapons program.

55. De Gaulle's belief that France must have its own nuclear forces is not widely shared by other French political leaders or even by military leaders. Some are concerned about the high cost of developing sophisticated delivery systems, some fear that France's interest in NATO will decline as its preoccupation with an independent program grows, others are opposed to the program simply because they wish to embarrass de Gaulle. The French position will probably become more flexible after de Gaulle leaves the scene. However, the longer he survives in office, the greater the investment the French will have in their own nuclear weapons and delivery system program, and the more reluctant they will be to accept a disarmament agreement which requires them to forego bringing their effort to fruition.

IV. UK ATTITUDES TOWARD DISARMAMENT

56. In part because of Britain's peculiar sense of vulnerability as a small, densely populated island, there is strong and genuine interest in disarmament both at the official and the popular level. In comparison to France, the UK places greater stress on disarmament, not only as a means of reducing military risks, but also as a step toward a more general relaxation of East-West tensions. Nevertheless, the government does not wish to jeopardize its relationship with the US by separating itself

too far from US policies on disarmament. Thus the UK has consistently seconded US demands that disarmament be approached by limited measures subjected to adequate controls, while discreetly pressing the US for a more flexible position on controls.

57. The UK, already an established nuclear power, has placed special stress on a nuclear test ban as a first disarmament step. It wishes in this way to inhibit the development of nuclear capabilities by additional countries, in particular West Germany. In the hope of persuading prospective nuclear powers to adhere to such a ban, the government has proposed the inclusion of Communist China in any future disarmament conference. With respect to France, if the UK became convinced that there was no other way to persuade the French to halt their national program, it might reluctantly endorse arrangements for multilateral nuclear sharing through NATO.

58. Disengagement in Central Europe is of less intense interest in the UK than it was formerly, though some Labour Party leaders still advocate it. The chief reasons for favoring such a regional arrangement are the reduction of tensions, the establishment of an inspection precedent, and the desire to limit Germany's military role. The UK continues to favor proposals for reduced ceilings on conventional forces, and has been rapidly pushing reductions in its own forces well below their proposed ceilings.

59. Disarmament matters are likely to assume increasing importance in UK foreign policy debates. The tendency for the UK to play the broker between the US and USSR in negotiation, while remaining the ally of the US, will probably grow. Public agitation against nuclear weapons is vigorous. By and large, though, the prospect is for no important shift in the present UK attitudes toward disarmament.

V. WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES ON DISARMAMENT

60. The West German attitude toward disarmament is marked by an intense preoccupation with the implications of any general disarmament agreements for the special se-

curity problems of the Federal Republic. Bonn sets less store by disarmament efforts as a means of insuring its security than does, say, the UK. It continues to be particularly concerned that it should have a full part in the formulation of any disarmament proposals. It is also especially sensitive to the possibility that Western defense efforts might be weakened during a period of disarmament discussions.

61. West German concerns center around those disarmament proposals which would place greater restrictions upon its forces than upon other powers, and those which might prejudice Bonn's position on Germany's political future. For these reasons, the Adenauer government opposes regional schemes confined to Central Europe, or any that would involve recognition of East Germany or the Oder-Neisse line, or that would require West Germany to leave NATO. In addition, while we do not believe that West Germany is presently bent upon acquisition of an independent nuclear capability, it would probably oppose any new measures which permanently foreclosed that option without at the same time at least bringing under strict control the nuclear capabilities of other powers.

62. The Adenauer government has thus far been content primarily to insure itself a consultative voice in Western councils on this issue. Mistrusting the motives of the UK, the West Germans rely upon France and the US to adopt positions which in effect protect German interests. As West Germany's national power increases, we believe that it will seek a more direct voice in these matters, particularly if negotiations appear to be heading for agreements. Meanwhile, German spokesmen will continue to give strong public endorsement to the concept of general controlled disarmament as a prerequisite for detente and the settlement of outstanding political problems. A factor in this public position is the hope on the part of some German officials that persistent emphasis on the primacy of disarmament over all other outstanding issues might postpone negotiations on the Berlin question.

VI. CANADIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD DISARMAMENT

63. Canada seeks to play a special role in disarmament negotiations. Fearing involvement in nuclear war, and desiring to demonstrate independence of the US, Canada has attempted to create a role for itself as a leader of the "middle powers" urging the major contestants into serious negotiations. Canada has been unconcerned by its allies' displeasure at its initiative. The government urges that disarmament not be made contingent upon

other political settlements and puts first priority on the problems of nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities. Foreign Minister Green in particular has become deeply committed to this approach and has made disarmament a primary concern of Canadian foreign policy. He urges that there be no further nuclear testing, whether or not a control system is agreed upon. We believe that interest in disarmament is widespread and will continue to be reflected in Canadian policy under future administrations.